Introduction
Intellectual property rights are widely recognized as critical assets in many industries, especially "high-tech" industries. Companies like IBM, Intel, and Hewlett-Packard regard their patents and copyrights, along with their other intangible assets such as know-how, as central elements giving them competitive advantage. Likewise, many software companies, from Microsoft to software startups seeking funding from venture capitalists, recognize that copyright protection is essential if they are to recoup their expenditures developing new software. Put simply, patents and copyrights are often the crown jewels in a high-tech company's collection of assets.
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Intellectual property rights, while by no means the only way for firms to recoup their investments in research and development, are of increasing strategic importance in a range of industries, including semiconductors, networking equipment, and biotechnology as well as software.
2 And now, with patents being issued for "business methods" like Amazon's one-click shopping, software patents are poised to have a major impact on the commercialization of the Internet. that handles digital-rights management. As is common in these disputes, the lawsuit followed failed attempts to negotiate a license, and multiple patents are involved; InterTrust asserts that it holds 18 U.S. patents and has filed applications for 47 others. 4 The increasing importance and number of patents and copyrights inevitably is leading to more and more intellectual property disputes between rights holders and alleged infringers. In fact, since many products can potentially infringe multiple patents, the number of disputes, or the number of licenses needed to resolve those disputes, can easily grow more than proportionately with the number of patents. As I have described elsewhere, more and more companies are facing a patent thicket requiring them to obtain multiple licenses to bring their products to market. 5 No doubt the majority of intellectual property disputes are settled rather than litigated to a final resolution.
The need to negotiate licenses or other settlements of intellectual property disputes is made even greater because of the danger of hidden or submarine patents, which make it all too easy for a company unintentionally to infringe on a patent that was not yet issued when the company's product was designed. 6 Likewise, the need to resolve intellectual property disputes is arguably made yet greater to the extent that the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office has issued "bad" patents, i.e., patents on technology that does not in fact meet the novelty requirement. Many critics have charged that the PTO has had a poor understanding of prior art, especially in the software area, and improperly issued a number of patents. 7 Bad or not, there is no dispute that 5 See Shapiro (2001) . For some thoughtful proposals to reform the patent system, see Merges (1999) . 6 Recent reforms to disclose some patent applications prior to the issuance of the patent should alleviate, but not eliminate, this problem. The ability of those applying for patents to revise their patent applications over time tends to exacerbate this problem. 7 There are many striking examples of such "bad" patents. For a few entertaining accounts of the problem, see Simon Garfinkel, "Patently Absurd," Wired, July 1994, Evan Ratliff, "Patent Upending," Wired , June 2000, and the number of patents being issued is growing dramatically. In short, a compelling case can be made that intellectual property disputes are of increasing importance in determining just which firms can compete in which markets, and on what terms.
A wide range of commercial arrangements involving intellectual property can be regarded as settlements of intellectual property disputes, either literally (in the sense that litigation has been initiated and is dropped once an agreement is reached) or effectively (because negotiation takes place in the shadow of possible litigation). Virtually every patent license can be viewed as a settlement of a patent dispute: the royalty rate presumably reflects the two parties' strengths or weaknesses in patent litigation in conjunction with the licensee's ability to invent around the patent. The same is true of cross-licenses, where net payments reflect the strength of each party's patent portfolio along with its commercial exposure to the other's patents. Mergers and joint ventures are yet more ways to settle patent disputes.
Given the importance of patents and their licensing to innovation, and given the many commercial arrangements that are effectively settlements of intellectual property disputes, the legal rules governing the resolution of such disputes are of first-order importance. This importance is not confined to high-tech industries, much less to the software and Internet sectors, but extends to all industries where intellectual property rights are significant. In a very real sense, the rules governing settlements affect what is truly meant by the patent grant itself. In fact, in many fast-moving industries, the rules governing patent litigation and settlements are arguably far more important to patentees than the single variable on which economists have traditionally focused, namely patent length.
8 James Gleick, "Patently Absurd," New York Times Magazine, March 12, 2000 . See also Lerner (2000) for an indepth look at financial patents, including the (in)famous patent in the State Street case, a key court ruling supporting the notion of patents on business methods. But do not despair: there is now a web site that will help those accused of infringing find prior art and thus invalidate the patent asserted against them. See www.bountyquest.com. 9 I am not even including here the whole range of rules that determine patent validity and patent breadth, such as the standard for novelty, the procedures by which the PTO looks for prior art, the ability of the applicant to modify its patent application, the rules for disclosure of patent applications prior to issuance, the ability of third parties to challenge the patent either prior to its issue or immediately upon issuance, the burden of proof in infringement validity and infringement cases, the rules governing interferences (when multiple contemporaneous patent applications conflict with each other), and the implementation of the doctrine of equivalents. Patent rules in the context of sequential innovation have been studied by Chang (1995) , Scotchmer (1996) to jointly license their patents necessary to the production of DVD discs and players, the DOJ issued a business review letter approving their plan subject to certain conditions.
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Within the area of antitrust limits on settlements, the current paper is fairly ambitious. In the next section, I discuss generally the benefits and costs of settlements and explain more fully why antitrust limits on settlements are unquestionably needed to prevent abuse of the settlement process. Then, in Section 3, I propose and develop a general rule for evaluating proposed settlements, namely a requirement that the proposed settlement generate at least as much surplus for consumers as they would have enjoyed had the settlement not been reached and the dispute instead been resolved through litigation. My proposed rule is designed to fully respect intellectual property rights, while emphasizing that such rights are inherently uncertain or imperfect, at least until they have successfully survived a challenge in court. My proposed rule is also intended to enable a wide range of settlements that can enhance efficiency and promote competition without depriving rights holders of their legitimate returns to invention. I prove a very general result showing that in virtually all cases settlements exist that are better for consumers as well as the settling parties in comparison with ongoing litigation. The balance of the paper then applies the general rule to three different types of settlements. For each type of settlement, I develop some basic theory and describe some actual settlements in this category where antitrust issues have arisen. Section 4 handles mergers. Section 5 covers negotiated entry dates. Section 6 covers patent pools. Section 7 summarizes my conclusions and outlines some ways in which my analysis can be extended.
Two interesting by-products of this analysis are worth noting. First, I develop a "Patent
Competition Index" which measures of extent of competition between two parties who are engaged in a patent dispute. This intuitive measure tells us how large must be the efficiencies associated with a merger (i.e., the complete elimination of competition) between the two parties in order for such a merger to be better for consumers than ongoing litigation and competition.
Second, in various settings I am able to derive the relationship between the profits earned by the patent holder and the strength of its patent, as defined by the probability that the patent will be held valid and infringed if patent infringement is litigated to a resolution. 17 As I show below, in a number of settings the patent holder's expected profits are not linear in patent strength, so a patent with a 50% chance of being upheld is not necessarily worth half as much as an ironclad patent covering the same patent claims.
Benefits, Costs, and Dangers of Patent Settlements

A. Benefits and Costs of Settlements
Settlements of litigation generally are recognized to provide a number of private and social benefits. Private benefits include the avoidance of litigation costs and the resolution of uncertainty. Social benefits include savings on court costs and/or reduction of congestion in the court system. Social costs can include the lack of resolution of a legal issue with applicability beyond the individual case at hand. Generally speaking, the courts have strongly favored settlements, if nothing else just to reduce their case load and speed up the resolution of remaining matters.
Unlike many other settlements of litigation, settlements of patent litigation between rivals by their very nature implicate competition, and thus tend to have effects on third parties, most notably (but not only) customers of the litigating parties. Patent settlements certainly can enable the settling parties to compete more effectively with others, as when two firms with complementary patents agree to a cross-license enabling each of them to make higher-quality products or achieve lower production costs. But patent settlements can also enable the settling parties to restrict competition between themselves, to the detriment of consumers. Consumers may suffer from lost rivalry, both during the interim period while patent litigation would have continued, and perhaps in the longer term as well, at least until the patent expires. Settlements can deprive consumers not only of competition between the settling parties, but from other firms as well if an invalid patent is never actually challenged.
17 Various empirical papers have attempted to measure the value of real-world patents. See, for example, Lanjouw (1998) and Schankerman (1998) .
B. Unconstrained Settlements and Their Dangers
Patent settlements present as especially tricky area for antitrust because of the undisputed procompetitive benefits that can result from a wide range of settlements, including the vast majority of patent licenses. Such pro-competitive settlements are by no means confined to settlements between rivals, but certainly can include such cases. Drawing the line between "price fixing agreements" and "pro-competitive licensing arrangements" is not a simple matter. But the need to draw some line should not be in dispute.
Suppose that two rivals can settle their patent dispute with no antitrust limits. Of course, they still must successfully reach an agreement to settle their dispute, and this may be difficult for the usual reasons that negotiations break down, including potentially asymmetric information (more specifically, optimism on both sides about their prospects in litigation). But for now let us assume that the two firms bargain efficiently and thus reach a settlement that maximizes joint profits. What do such settlements look like?
It is immediately evident that such settlements could be used to eliminate competition that would have arisen had the patent holder lost. By eliminating such competition, monopoly profits can be enjoyed, even if the patent was very weak, or even worthless. There are many ways that such settlements could be structured: (1) the patent holder could acquire the challenger, with the purchase price set in some mutually agreeable fashion to split the gains from trade, including the gains from eliminating competition; (2) the patent holder could make a fixed payment to the challenger in exchange for the challenger's agreement not to compete, either at all or in certain product areas, geographic areas, or during some specified time period; (3) the two companies could enter into a joint venture or other cooperative arrangement (such as a supply agreement or co-marketing setup) whereby they both participate in the market without directly competing against each other; or (4) the challenger could agree to pay certain per-unit royalties to the patent holder in conjunction with a fixed payment running from the patent holder to the challenger.
The only requirements for such profit-maximizing settlements are (a) that they preserve the monopoly power that the patentee would have had in the absence of the challenger, and (b) that each party find it individually rational to accept the settlement rather than continue to litigate.
A hallmark of these anti-competitive agreements is that the patent holder agrees to share its monopoly profits with the challenger in order to induce the challenger to give up its fight. In the merger context this is clear: the challenger is paid the acquisition price. A bald payment not to compete is even more explicit (and difficult to justify). A joint marketing program could also explicitly share the monopoly profits with the challenger. But note that the use of running royalties to monopolize typically will not be acceptable to the challenger unless the challenger also receives a fixed-fee payment (see below for the analysis of such two-part tariff schemes).
Clearly such agreements will tend to be contrary to the interests of consumers: with limits on patent settlements, consumers will receive only the surplus available facing a monopolist. Such settlements can deprive consumers of the advantages that competition, or at least its prospect, would have offered to them, during the interim period prior to the resolution of the patent dispute and subsequently, if the patent would have been declared invalid or not infringed, or had the challenger found a practical way to invent around the patent.
C. Patents as Partial Property Rights
It is important to bear in mind that the monopoly profits that can be (jointly) achieved through unconstrained settlement do not merely represent the rights granted to the patentee by virtue of having obtained the patent in the first place. A patent is best viewed as a partial or probabilistic property right. What the patent grant actually gives the patent holder is the right to sue to prevent others from infringing the patent. Nothing in the patent grant guarantees that the patent will be declared valid, or that the defendant in the patent suit will be found to have infringed. In other words, all real patents are less strong than the idealized patent grant usually imagined in economic theory.
A real patent may prove to be less valuable than the idealized patent in several distinct ways. (1) The real patent may be found invalid, either in whole or in part (if certain broader claims are declared invalid, perhaps based on prior art, but some narrower claims are upheld). (2) The real patent may be found not to be infringed by a given product sold or process employed by another firm. (3) The real patent may be relatively easy for others to invent around rather than pay royalties or be forced to cease production. (4) The real patentee may be unable to obtain a preliminary injunction to prevent alleged infringement. (5) The real patentee may not be able to receive as a judgment all of its lost profits that result from infringement, e.g., if the infringer's assets are insufficient to satisfy the award.
In this paper, I shall take as given the bundle of uncertain and imperfect rights that we call a "patent." These rights are typically far less valuable than would be idealized "ironclad" patent rights. In my view, the patent holder is not "entitled" to obtain the same level of profits, or the same rights to exclude rivals, as would the owner of the fictionalized ironclad patent. Therefore, the patent holder is not "entitled" to negotiate a monopoly outcome, just because the patent holder asserts that its patent is valid and infringed by a particular rival. Rather, the patent holder's rights are calibrated according to the likelihood that the patent holder would win the patent litigation, and the extent of exclusion that such a victory would permit. Generally, these rights are not as strong or as valuable as the rights of a full-fledged monopolist owning an ironclad, blocking patent.
Proposed Principle: Settlement Cannot Harm Consumers
Given the obvious incentive to use settlements to replicate the monopoly outcome, and given that the patent grant is not the same as an ironclad right to monopoly profits, antitrust limits on settlements are clearly needed. At the same time, a prohibition on settling patent disputes cannot make sense: as noted earlier, virtually every patent license can be viewed as the settlement of a patent dispute, and more generally settlements can provide many benefits not only to the settling parties but to consumers as well. Since many settlements are pro-competitive, in the sense that consumers are better off under the settlement than they would be from ongoing litigation, overly strict antitrust limits, not to mention a ban on settlements, would clearly be counterproductive.
So, we must face the complex question of how to draw the line between acceptable and unacceptable patent settlements from an antitrust perspective. In this paper, I propose and explore in some depth the following simple antitrust rule: a patent settlement cannot lead to lower expected consumer surplus than would have arisen from ongoing litigation.
I believe that this standard has much to commend itself. In particular, I argue that this standard balances the rights of patentees with consumer interests. Effectively, consumers have a "property right" to the level of competition that would have prevailed, on average, had the two parties litigated the patent dispute to a resolution in the courts. So long as consumers rights to this level of competition/benefits are respected, the two parties are permitted to negotiate more profitable arrangements that are better than litigation for each of them as well as consumers.
My proposed standard balances the rights of patent holders with those of consumers. 18 Since patents involve "partial" or "probabilistic" property rights, as discussed above, patent holders are not entitled to the same level of profits that would be result from an ironclad patent covering the same patent claims. Put differently, competition that would take place under the shadow of patent litigation is considered entirely legitimate, even though it may wind up constituting infringement. Lurking behind this view are two broad assumptions worth making explicit: (1) I take as given the intellectual property rights regime, with its necessary imperfections, such as the granting of patents that will later be found invalid and the chance that the holder of a valid patent may not be able to obtain an injunction to stop what turns out to be actual infringement; (2) I take as given the damages regime associated with patent infringement, including both the rules for calculating damages and the fact that patentees may not be able to fully collect on damage awards in some cases, e.g., if the infringer declares bankruptcy or is beyond the Court's reach.
My proposed standard for patent settlements also is consistent with how antitrust policy and law treat other forms of collaboration among competitors. A proposed merger, for example, is usually judged to be pro-competitive if consumers are better off under the proposed merger than they would be in the absence of the merger. The same standard is used for joint ventures and comarketing arrangements between direct rivals. 19 Likewise, under the FTC/DOJ Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property (cited above), licenses are generally regarded as procompetitive if they do not restrict competition that would have taken place in the absence of the license. Of course, in practice it may be difficult to compare consumer surplus under two 18 Antitrust enforcement (such as merger review) often uses a consumer-welfare standard rather than a total-surplus standard. Clearly, a short-run consumer-surplus standard is not sensible when intellectual property rights are involved: declaring all extant intellectual property rights invalid could well maximize short-run consumer surplus, but at the obvious expense of longer-term innovation and consumer interests. Indeed, it is hard to articulate an alternative standard that encourages innovation in the long-run, efficient commercial arrangements in the short-run, and still protects consumers from cartel-like settlements.
different arrangements due to imperfect information about industry conditions. 20 And antitrust enforcement of patent settlements may well require an informed judgment as to the strength of various patents that are at issue.
An alternative antitrust rule, less favorable to settling parties, would look not only at the effects on consumers of their overall agreement, as I am proposing here, but also at the effects of specific provisions in the agreement. Under a full-blown "less restrictive alternative" approach, an agreement would be declared anti-competitive if an alternative agreement could have been fashioned, perhaps by removing or modifying certain provisions in the original agreement, that would be even better for consumers than the proposed agreement.
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Clearly, taken to an extreme such an approach would not in fact respect intellectual property rights. Consider, for example, the case of two holders of complementary, blocking patents who agree to place their patents into a pool and license them jointly at an agreed-upon royalty rate.
As shown in Section 6 below, such a pool can easily be in consumers' interests, in comparison, say, with independent licensing programs by the two firms, since independent licensing runs into the problem of Cournot complements. Just as clearly, however, consumers would be better off (in the short run) if the two firms agreed to a royalty-free cross license, as each could then compete independently with no licensing cost burden. But compelling such a cross-license in favor over the patent pool could well deprive both firms of a return on their R&D that led to their patent. I do not expect to resolve this debate here, which arises in other areas of antitrust; I merely note that the standard I explore here may not be universally accepted.
A. Pareto Optimality and Gains from Settlement
I now prove a general result showing that there are invariably gains from settling a patent dispute, even ignoring the savings associated with reduced litigation costs and uncertainty.
Consider two firms that are actual or potential competitors who are engaged in a patent dispute.
Firm #1 we will call the patent holder or the incumbent. Firm #2 we will call the alleged infringer, the challenger, or the entrant. There are a number of possible outcomes of their patent dispute, if it is litigated to completion; we index these states of the world by 1,...
For example, one state might be that the patent is declared invalid. A number of other states might correspond to various levels of cost required for the challenger to invent around the patent. This framework is quite general: a finding of non-infringement would correspond to a zero cost of inventing around the patent; a finding that some of the broader claims in the patent are invalid while narrower claims are valid would correspond to lower, but still positive, costs of inventing around the patent. Suppose that both sides agree that the probability of state w is w θ .
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The general antitrust rule explored in this paper is that a settlement should be permitted if it leaves consumers at least as well off as they would be, in expected value, from ongoing litigation and resolution of the patent dispute in court. Denote consumer surplus in state w by w S . This is a reduced-form that incorporates whatever duopoly (or oligopoly) solution concept applies in the 22 Obviously, the two firms may well have asymmetric beliefs about the likelihoods of the various states of the world. Indeed, it is mutual optimism that tends to lead to litigation rather than settlement. The proper treatment of asymmetric information, including possible updating of beliefs based on settlement offers, is beyond the scope of this paper. Unless otherwise indicated, I shall generally assume the two firms share common beliefs about the probabilities of various outcomes in their patent dispute. Relaxing this assumption leads to a rich area for further research.
various states of the world. If resolution of the patent dispute takes time, then w S includes consumer surplus during the interim period while the dispute is litigated. To the extent that information is revealed gradually, and the firms' behavior can adjust (e.g., to preliminary court rulings), consumer surplus will vary somewhat with the state of the world even before that state is fully revealed.
With these definitions, the expected consumer surplus from ongoing litigation is 
Since the weights on the profit and surplus functions across the states of nature are identical, the solution to this maximization necessarily involves solving the sub-problem of 23 Note that the profit function itself is not indexed by the states of nature. Recall that the states of nature correspond to the outcome of the patent litigation and thus the resolution of property rights; they do not reflect the resolution of any fundamental uncertainty about underlying cost or demand conditions. The underlying idea here is that the two parties should efficiently product consumer surplus.
There is no reason for the two parties to introduce randomness into their actions, just because 
B. Benefits of Optimal Settlement: Price/Quantity Examples
We can illustrate these gains from settlement more concretely when the firms are picking prices and quantities. In fact, for a given set of products, we know a great deal about the solution to equation (4), since it is the dual to the standard Ramsey pricing problem.
Suppose the incumbent firm produces a single product, the demand for which is denoted by The expected consumer surplus if the parties do not settle is given by
Call p the price that generates surplus level S . The optimal settlement subject to the consumer surplus constraint involves a price of p in all states of the world. In other words, we must have thus competition limited without a settlement), to waive its privilege and share its internal assessment with antitrust enforcers.
Bertrand Competition
If 
Cournot Competition
Turn now to the companion case in which the firms are Cournot competitors. This case differs from the Bertrand case in that consumers benefit less from the possibility of successful entry, and the entrant makes positive profits if it wins the patent suit. I continue to assume that the entrant is equally efficient to the incumbent (and marginal costs are constant), thus abstracting away from issues of how to achieve production efficiency in the context of a settlement.
The Cournot Duopoly price is given by Of course, there are no gains to the challenger if there is no uncertainty, i.e. if 0 θ = or 1 θ = , because the settlement just replicates the certain outcome in these polar cases. For all intermediate values of θ , the challenger is strictly better off under the settlement in the absence of a fixed payment running in either direction. This is important, because it implies that no fixed payment from the patentee to the challenger is required to implement the optimal settlement.
Since it is exactly such payments that raise antitrust concerns, this is an encouraging result: the optimal royalty should be acceptable to the challenger without the use of a fixed payment, which could be abused by the settling parties if antitrust enforcers lack the information (such as patent strength) needed to check that the consumer surplus constraint is satisfied. 
Rationalization of Production
In both of these cases I assumed that the two firms had constant and equal marginal costs of production, so the mix of production between the two firms was irrelevant from the perspective of production efficiency. What about the case in which the two firms have, in general, different costs as a function of output, and in which marginal costs are not constant?
If there are economies of scale in production, the optimal settlement involves one firm shutting down. But for this settlement to meet the consumer-surplus constraint, the other firm will typically have to produce more than the monopoly output. Assuming that the antitrust authorities do not want to engage in direct regulation of the remaining firm, some type of supply agreement is needed to insure that output is sufficiently large that consumers are not disadvantaged. 28 Such supply agreements can work well in theory, enabling competition while taking advantage of economies of scale, but present a range of problems in practice, especially if costs are uncertain and likely to change over time.
Even in the absence of strong scale economies, efficiency can still be promoted by rationalizing output across the two firms, especially if one firm is considerably more efficient that the other.
Consider, for example, the case in which the patent holder is primarily a research outfit that can engage in some manufacturing, whereas the challenger has a large, established, manufacturing presence (for related, non-infringing products) and is far more efficient at production. The obvious solution here is for the challenger to obtain a license to the patent. But some degree of "inefficient" production by the patent holder may be needed to protect consumers from paying monopoly prices set by the licensee. Structuring the license with a higher fixed fee and lower running royalties can also help insure that the resulting price is low enough to satisfy the consumer-surplus constraint, but this solution may not be enough.
Differentiated Products
In many cases the challenger offers a product that is distinct from the offerings of the patent holder. Clearly, efficient provision of consumer surplus may well involve preserving both products under the terms of the settlement. In general, if efficiency requires both products to be produced, the two parties can use per-unit royalties and fixed-fee payments to move around their reaction curves and thus induce a Bertrand pricing equilibrium that replicates the optimal settlement. However, the resulting contract may require per-unit royalties running from the patent holder to the challenger, which tends to raise its own antitrust concerns. (In this respect, settling litigation in which each party is asserting patents against the other can provide more flexibility to the settling parties.) If such payments are prohibited, the primary tool remaining to influence the Bertrand equilibrium is the royalty rate pay by the challenger to the patent holder.
But the fully optimal settlement may not be obtainable as an induced Bertrand equilibrium. And an outright merger might well not satisfy the consumer-surplus constraint, unless the merger would generate its own efficiencies.
Mergers and the Patent Competition Index (PCI)
I turn now from a general discussion of the benefits from settlement to an analysis of specific types of settlements, which occupies the remainder of this paper. I begin in this section with the most inclusive form of settlement, namely an outright merger between the two parties to the patent dispute. Two real-world examples (along with the Digital/Intel example noted earlier) illustrate the types of mergers studied here. The first example is the acquisition by Boston
Scientific of Cardiovascular Imaging Systems (CVIS). Boston Scientific, a large company that makes a range of medical equipment, was producing and selling certain imaging catheters that CVIS, a small company, claimed infringed its patents. To settle the dispute, Boston Scientific acquired CVIS. The FTC required that Boston Scientific license the CVIS patents as a condition 28 These same issues come up when firms seek to merge and offer as an antitrust "fix" a joint venture or supply agreement to preserve competition while taking advantage of economies of scale.
for approving the merger. 29 A second, more recent example is the acquisition by Gemstar of TV Guide. Gemstar asserted that TV Guide's "interactive program guides," basically on-screen interactive information about TV program listings, infringed Gemstar's patents. Gemstar offered its own guides. After years of litigating and competing against Gemstar, TV Guide agreed to be acquired. The DOJ did not challenge this merger.
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A. The Patent Competition Index
Suppose that the two firms engaged in the patent dispute agree to merge, completely eliminating competition. Consumer surplus under a merger, assuming no efficiencies, is just the level from monopoly, M S . Expected consumer surplus from ongoing litigation has already been defined as S , so the merger will cause a loss of consumer surplus of
Compare this to the loss of consumer surplus that would result from a merger between these two parties if the challenger were known not to be infringing the patent, i. Besides giving a sense of how much competition may be lost as a result of a proposed settlement involving a full merger, the PCI also tells us how large the efficiencies associated with the merger must be, relative to the efficiencies that would be required to justify a merger without the patent overlay. Call the extra consumer benefits flowing from efficiencies associated with the merger E. Call the minimum such benefits that would make a conventional merger attractive to
Likewise, call minimum such benefits that would make the proposed settlement attractive to consumer E : M S E S + = . In other words, the PCI can also be interpreted as the magnitude of efficiencies required to make the settlement pro-competitive, calibrated to the efficiencies that would be required of a conventional merger in which the challenger does not face a patent "cloud" over its ability to compete. I record this simple arithmetic in the form of a Proposition:
Proposition #4, Efficiencies Necessary for Consumers to Benefit from a Merger Settlement:
Suppose that a conventional merger between two firms would need to generate efficiencies causing extra consumer surplus of E to benefit consumers. Then a patent settlement between these two firms must generate efficiencies causing extra consumer surplus of PCI*E to benefit consumers, where PCI is the Patent Competition Index, from (6).
So long as there is some degree of competition between the merging parties, either prior to the settlement or in prospect in the absence of a settlement, a merger cannot benefit consumers unless it generates at least some efficiencies. In other words, the fact that there is a patent cloud of some type hanging over the challenger reduces, but does not eliminate, the need for merger efficiencies to offset anti-competitive effects.
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B.
Calculating the Patent Competition Index I now derive the Patent Competition Index in a several specific cases.
Immediate Resolution of Patent Litigation
Suppose that the patent litigation could be resolved instantly and there are only two possible outcomes. With probability θ , the patent holder wins, in which case the challenger is totally blocked from the market. With probability 1 θ − , the challenger wins, in which case the challenger is found to not infringe the patent (but the patent is still valid). In this simple case, causing the patent suit to be dropped may face a higher hurdle in terms of efficiency than a plain vanilla merger involving the same companies in which the challenger is known not to infringe.
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Next, consider the case in which losing the patent litigation does not completely exclude the challenger from the market but simply imposes a cost penalty on the challenger as a result of the need to invent around the patent. 34 We A c E − +∆ = ∆ . To meet the required level of efficiencies, the per-unit cost savings must 33 A complete analysis would account for the probability that another challenger would continue ahead with litigation and prove the patent invalid. Of course, the holder of a weak patent might settle with a series of challenger to avoid just this outcome.
34 Inventing around could also take time. See the next subsection for a discussion of cases in which competition varies over time. 35 I have returned to the assumption that a victory by the challenger means that the challenger is held not to be infringing, but leaves the patent intact. I do not develop here the general case in which there are many possible outcomes of the patent litigation, involving different values of c and perhaps patent invalidity as well.
Since consumer benefits are convex in the cost saving, the per-unit cost saving necessary if 1/ 2 PCI = is more than half of the cost saving that would be required to justify a conventional merger.
Delayed Resolution of Patent Litigation w/ No Interim Competition
What about the realistic case in which the patent litigation takes some time.
More precisely, what about the case in which the settlement occurs well before the patent litigation would likely be resolved in the courts?
In this case, we must explicitly keep track of the passage of time and recognize that competitive conditions can change over time. Call the date of the settlement time 0 t = , and the expiration of the patent date 1 t = . Define the interim period to be the period, [0, ] T until the patent litigation would be resolved in the courts. 36 To keep things simple, I assume that demand conditions, and the presence or absence of other firms, does not vary over the time interval [0, 1] , and I will assume a zero interest rate. Relaxing these assumption would be straightforward but add considerable complexity of the resulting expressions.
To focus on the timing and the possible differences between the interim period [0, ] T and the subsequent time period [ ,1 ] T , let me return to the case in which a victory by the challenger would lead to a standard duopoly situation (i.e., would mean a finding of patent validity but noninfringement). If the challenger would choose not to compete during the interim period, 37 then consumer surplus under litigation would be (1 )( 38 We get the same result if the challenger is not allowed to compete because the Court has issued a preliminary injunction ordering the challenger to cease its possible infringement.
Delayed Resolution of Patent Litigation with Interim Competition
A more interesting situation arises if the challenger would choose to compete during the pendency of the patent litigation. For example, in the Gemstar/TV Guide merger, TV Guide continued to offer its interactive program guides to cable companies, along with patent indemnification, while under the threat of Gemstar's patent suit. If the actual level of competition and consumer surplus during the pendency of the patent suit can be observed, the PCI is relatively easy to calculate directly.
To study how competition is likely to play out under the shadow of patent liability, we must specify the liability to which the challenger is potentially exposed by infringing the patent.
Clearly, such liability will tend to impede the challenger's ability to compete effectively. Call the consumer surplus resulting from competition between the incumbent and the challenger facing potential liability for infringing L S . Then we have
As above, calibrate the consumer benefits associated with the "impeded" duopoly, L S , Of course, to analyze the challenger's behavior, we need to specify the legal rules governing the calculation of damages in the event the patent is subsequently found to be valid and infringed. I shall work with a legal rule that awards lost profits to the patentee. 39 Denote by M π the patentee's profits in the absence of competition from the challenger. If the patentee's (flow) profits during the interim period are 1 π , then the (flow) damages due are
To illustrate these points, I now derive the Bertrand and Cournot equilibria when the challenger faces potential liability for infringing. I believe that this analysis is of independent interest as it characterizes price and quantity competition in the face of uncertainty about liability for infringement.
Bertrand Pricing Game Between Patent Holder and Challenger
Consider the case of homogeneous goods and Bertrand competition, perhaps better thought of as bidding competition to serve the market (or a single customer). As is often the case, Bertrand equilibrium with homogeneous products is quite a fragile concept. Denote by ( ) i p π the profits to firm i from winning at price p . If the two firms are equally efficient, 1
I now show that an equally efficient challenger will simply not enter the market under these conditions. Indeed, the entrant must be much more efficient than the incumbent to make entry profitable. As a consequence, even a weak patent can yield monopoly profits. This is a new twist on the well-known fact that an entrant with even a very small fixed cost of entry will not enter just to compete on price against an equally efficient rival. Here, there is effectively a fixed cost of entry, namely the expected liability costs of participating in the market.
39 I am assuming here that damages equal to lost profits, not a multiple of lost profits. In the case of willful infringement, damages can equal three times the lost profits.
40 Some very interesting questions regarding the treatment of mitigation in the calculation of damages are beyond the scope of this paper. If the patent holder could earn higher profits by adopting an alternative strategy in the face of infringement, i.e., if the patent holder does not do its best to mitigate damages, full lost profits may not be awarded. As a general principle, a damages rule that only award damages that could not be avoided has the property that the incumbent should ignore damages when setting its strategy during the interim period: damages are not influenced by the incumbent's actual strategy, but only by the lost profits under the incumbent's optimal strategy. By the same logic used below in the Cournot case, it can be shown in general that in a pure-strategy equilibrium, there is no difference between the rule that awards actual damages and the rule that awards the minimum possible damages (given the conduct of the infringing firm).
If the challenger enters the market and wins at price p, then the challenger's payoff is given by This analysis gives quite a strong, even striking result: the patent holder can capture the full monopoly profits, even if the patent is very weak. Here, a key question is whether the potential entrant can bid for business without exposing itself to liability in the event that the incumbent meets or beats the entrant's prices and thus wins the bidding. But this seems even harder to do than the corresponding strategy in the Bertrand pricing game with a fixed entry cost, where the entrant may be able to adopt a bidding strategy that allows it to avoid incurring the fixed entry costs if it loses the bidding. Here, if the entrant's bid induces a response from the incumbent, liability for infringement will be hard to avoid. Then the challenger will not enter the market, and the patent holder will capture the monopoly profits, even if the patent is arbitrarily weak (θ very small but still positive).
In this situation, since 0 L PCI = , consumers receive no benefits from interim competition and settlements look relatively attractive.
Output Game Between Patent Holder and Challenger
In the corresponding Cournot game, the firms simultaneously set outputs, resulting in a price (and profits) during the interim period. Then, if the challenger is found to have infringed, the challenger owes damages to the patent holder equal to the difference between monopoly profits and the profits actually earned by the patent holder 
Naturally, when the patent is very weak, so 0 θ ≈ , we get back the standard Cournot equilibrium.
When the patent is strong, so 1 θ ≈ , the challenger only produces if it is more efficient that the patent holder 2 1 ( ) c c < . If the challenger is not more efficient, equation (7) gives us back the monopoly output level of the patent holder; if the challenger is more efficient, we get the monopoly output level of the challenger. Effectively, the challenger maximizes profits for its lower level of costs and then compensates the patent holder for its own (lower) level of monopoly profits. This is one of many cases in which infringement by a more efficient firm is optimal so long as damages are equal to lost profits, not a multiple of lost profits (as in fact can occur for willful infringement).
Focusing now on the case in which the two firms are equally efficient, so 1 2 c c c = = , the interim output level is given by For example, when 1/ 2 θ = , we get 0.57 PCI =
. A patent with a 50% chance of winning generates more than 50% of the benefits to consumers from full-fledged duopoly. The extra benefits consumers get on average from interim competition, in comparison with subsequent competition, are greatest when infringement is very much in doubt, i.e., when θ is in the neighborhood of one-half.
Proposition #6 tells us that the overall Patent Competition Index, calculated above to be To keep things simple, let us suppose again that there are only two outcomes of the patent litigation: the patent is valid and infringed with probability θ , or the patent is valid but not infringed with probability 1 θ − .
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As above, call the date of the settlement time 0 t = , the expiration of the patent date 1 t = , and denote by T the date at which the entrant could enter if successful in the patent litigation.
Restricting attention to settlements simply involving an entry date (but no royalties), it is easy to see which settlements leave consumers whole.
Absent any settlement, expected consumer surplus is (1 )( 
To the extent that the patent holder believes the patent is stronger than does the challenger, settlement is made even more difficult, as the patent holder will insist on a later entry date and the challenger not agree to wait so long to enter.
In this simple model, a naked cash payment flowing from the patent holder to the challenger (in excess of avoided litigation costs) is a clear signal that the settlement is likely to be anticompetitive. Presumably, the patent holder would not pay more than avoided litigation costs unless it believed that it was buying later entry than it expects to face through the litigation alternative. For this reason, the FTC has a sound basis for its skepticism regarding "reverse cash payments" from the patent holder to the challenger. This is not to say that such payments are necessarily anti-competitive if other factors are brought into the analysis, such as risk aversion and asymmetric information about market conditions, as "reverse cash payments" may be important in more complex settings for successful settlement.
Some of the settlements challenged by the FTC also involved the transfer of non-cash assets from the challenger to the patent holder. These side deals pose some additional, interesting questions. If the non-cash assets have a well-defined market value, then they can be treated much like cash. The proper test then involves comparing the net payment from the challenger to the patent holder to avoided litigation costs. A large net payment running from the patent holder to the challenger is inherently suspicious. A net payment running from the challenger to the patent holder should be quite welcome to antitrust officials, although it raises a tricky question:
presumably, the challenger is paying for earlier entry than would occur (on average) from litigation, but if this is the case, why is it mutually profitable for the firms to agree to earlier entry if entry dissipates joint profits? One benign answer is that joint profits rise with entry because the challenger brings complementary assets to the market or because the entrant earns more profits by taking business from other firms than it reduces the incumbent's profits.
If the non-cash assets received by the patent holder have no well-defined market value, it becomes necessary to estimate their value to the patent holder. If the patent holder is receiving more in value, as seen through its own eyes, than it is giving up, the patent holder is making no net payment to the challenger, and there is no basis for presuming that the settlement delays entry in comparison with litigation. Patent pools can easily be studied using the framework developed above. Suppose that firm #1
Patent Pools
and firm #2 each holds a patent that it asserts is essential to the manufacture of a given product.
If the firms are themselves manufacturers, as in the Summit/VisX case, the two firms will be suing each other. If the firms instead intend to license their patents to manufacturers, then both firms will be asserting their patents against these manufacturers. Either way, in the absence of some agreement we have a classic and inefficient situation involving Cournot complements.
In the absence of a settlement, suppose that litigation will be resolved, as above, at date T. Prior to that time, let us suppose that the firms will license their patents independently. This is the standard Cournot complements problem, yielding consumer surplus of C S .
After the litigation is resolved, one or both patents may be declared invalid. If each patent has strength θ , then we have effectively three possible outcomes. With probability 2 θ , both patents are valid and we presume that the companies would then be allowed to form a pool, leading to the monopoly outcome, with surplus M S . With probability 2 (1 ) θ θ − , precisely one patent is valid, in which case we again get the monopoly outcome. With probability The settlement to be evaluated is the formation of a patent pool. Under the terms of the pool, the two patents are licensed as a package for a specified royalty rate, r, with the license fees then 48 The 1997 MPEG case can be found at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/press_releases/1997/1173.htm. The first DVD pool was approved in December 1998; see http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/press_releases/1998/2120.htm. 
Since competition can only arise after date T, and even then only occurs with probability 2
(1 ) θ − , the monopoly pool can easily raise consumer surplus, if monopoly offers even a modest increase in surplus relative to Cournot complements.
More generally, we can define ( ) ( ) C I C S r S r S S µ − ≡ − . Then the maximum acceptable royalty rate is found by plugging ( ) r µ into equation (8). Since (0) 1 µ = , we know that a pool with a sufficiently low royalty rate will always be beneficial to consumers. But, as just noted, even a pool with the monopoly royalty rate can lead to higher consumer surplus than ongoing litigation, especially if the litigation will be protracted, so that T is large, or if the patents are strong. The second DVD pool was approved in June 1999; http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/press_releases/1999/2484.htm. The DOJ insisted that only "essential" patents be included in these pools.
These same methods can also be used to evaluate the effects of pools with more than two members. The equations are necessarily more complex, as we need to keep track of consumer surplus if k out of n patents are found valid, for 0,1, , k n = K . But the same principle articulated in Proposition #7 applies to these larger pools: if litigation is protracted and/or the patents are reasonably strong, even a pool replicating the monopoly outcome can be favorable for consumers. When this condition is met, antitrust concerns about proposed patent pools should be greatly reduced.
Conclusions and Extensions
In this paper, I have proposed and explored the following simple antitrust rule governing settlements of intellectual property disputes: a settlement cannot lead to lower expected consumer surplus than would have arisen from ongoing litigation. I argue that this rule respects intellectual property rights while encouraging efficient settlements. Under extremely general conditions, there exists a settlement that leaves consumers better off and raises the joint profits of the two firms engaged in the dispute. I then apply this general test to a several types of settlements: mergers; agreements specifying the timing of entry; and patent pools.
While this paper has covered a lot of ground, there are many more unresolved issues and questions in this and related areas. I close by noting a few on these outstanding questions.
First, I have focused here on situations involving a single patent, or, in the case of patent pools, just two patents. In many patent disputes, at least one party has a whole portfolio of patents. It remains to be seen how the presence of multiple patents affects my analysis. This would have implications for the incentives of firms to assemble, or perhaps disassemble, patent portfolios. I conjecture that there are diminishing returns to the number of patents held by one party.
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Second, I have explicitly avoided introducing asymmetric information between the two parties to an intellectual property dispute. Asymmetric information, and resulting differences in beliefs, are important factors that make settlement difficult. Another rich area of exploration involves marrying the analysis in this paper with the extensive literature on bargaining and signaling in the presence of asymmetric information. Risk aversion could also be included.
Finally, I have focused my attention on a single challenger to a patent, while recognizing that other potential competitors may benefit if a patent is held invalid or interpreted narrowly.
Another valuable extension would be to explicitly model multiple challengers, recognizing that the patent holder may have an incentive to settle with the strongest challenger, hoping that weaker challengers would then settle on more favorable terms. 49 In fact, I am aware of a situation in which one firm spun off part of its patent portfolio so that the two entities, each controlling essential patents for certain applications, could separately seek royalties from licensees.
